ICC9MORA 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 EUGENE MOROZOV, ET AL., Plaintiffs, 4 5 18 CV 3421 (GBD) V. 6 ICOBOX HUB INC., ET AL., 7 Defendants. 8 New York, N.Y. 9 December 12, 2018 10:28 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. GEORGE B. DANIELS 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 JOFFE LAW P.C. Attorney for Plaintiffs 15 BY: DIMITRY JOFFE 16 LUST & LEONOV, P.C. Attorney for Defendants 17 BY: ROMAN LEONOV 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 (Case called) 2 Dimitry Joffe, Joffe Law P.C., appearing MR. JOFFE: for plaintiffs. 3 4 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Joffe. 5 MR. LEONOV: Good morning, your Honor. Roman Leonov from Lust & Leonov, P.C. for all the defendants. 6 7 THE COURT: Good morning. Before Mr. Joffe I hear you with regard to your motion 8 for an order of attachment let me just deal with some other 9 10 issues that the parties have raised. 11 MR. JOFFE: Sure. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Leonov, you moved to withdraw as 13 counsel for one of the defendants. 14 MR. LEONOV: That's correct, your Honor. For 15 Alexander Moskovsky. That's correct. 16 THE COURT: What is his intention? Because, 17 obviously, he exposes himself to a default judgment against him 18 if he doesn't obtain another attorney or represent himself. So I want to make sure that he understands what the consequences 19 20 are of not having an attorney here and how he wants to proceed. 21 MR. LEONOV: He does, your Honor. And I explained it 22 to him. And his intentions were that I still make that motion. 23 What his other intentions are, I do not know, so. 24 THE COURT: Does he intend to get another lawyer?

Does he intend to represent himself? Does he intend to abandon

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the defense of this case? 1 2 MR. LEONOV: I explained all options to him. He gave me no information further than withdrawing. 3 THE COURT: This is what I want. I want a letter to 4 5 him indicating that I intend to grant your motion, if that's 6 his intent to proceed without counsel, without you as counsel. 7 But I want it in writing clear to him that he still has a responsibility to defend this case. And if he doesn't get a 8 9 new lawyer or indicate that he intends to defend himself 10 personally by participating in this case and coming to court, 11 then he may expose himself to a default judgment. 12 MR. LEONOV: Certainly, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: So make that clear to him. Once I see 14 that letter, it's provided to him -- is he in the United 15 States? 16 MR. LEONOV: I believe he's not, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Not? MR. LEONOV: I believe he's not. 18 THE COURT: So when I see that letter I'll so order it 19 20 and relieve you with regard to that. 21 MR. LEONOV: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Was he served? 23 MR. LEONOV: He made an appearance, yes.

THE COURT: So we'll proceed that way with regard to

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that.

1 MR. LEONOV: Thank you. 2 THE COURT: Just remind me. What is his -- other than being a shareholder in the original company, the ICOBOX Hub, 3 4 what is his other relationship to this? 5 MR. LEONOV: That is the issue. He was never a shareholder of ICOBOX Hub. He had a relationship with ICOBOX 6 7 which ended, according to him, before the plaintiff was involved. 8 9 THE COURT: So ICOBOX --10 MR. LEONOV: It's a separate entity. 11 THE COURT: -- Hub, Inc. MR. LEONOV: No. ICOBOX, he was involved with ICOBOX, 12 13 which is a Cayman entity. 14 THE COURT: And ICOBOX Hub, Inc. is a different entity 15 than ICOBOX? 16 MR. LEONOV: That is correct. 17 THE COURT: And he was a principal or shareholder of 18 ICOBOX? 19 MR. LEONOV: He was involved with ICOBOX but he was 20 never involved --21 THE COURT: I know, but what was the nature of his --22 MR. LEONOV: I believe he was involved there as an 23 investor or as one of the managers. 24 THE COURT: And ICOBOX, the difference between ICOBOX 25 and ICOBOX Hub is what?

that you are entitled?

	MR. LEONOV: ICOBOX is an entity in the Cayman Islands
and ICOBC	OX Hub, Inc. is an entity that tried to organize a
business	in the United States.
	THE COURT: What is the nature of the business?
	MR. LEONOV: ICOBOX Hub, Inc. tried to engage into
making cr	syptocurrency tokens and ICOBOX is already in the
business	of a similar business and nature but has its own
tokens di	fferent from ICOBOX Hub, Inc.
	THE COURT: And ICOBOX my recollection is that the
employmen	t contract between the plaintiff and the employment
contract	with the plaintiff was to be the CEO of ICOBOX Hub?
	MR. LEONOV: Correct.
	THE COURT: All right. So let me put that aside for
now.	
	I also received some letters with regard to discovery.
Is there	a genuine dispute about discovery?
	I guess I should turn that to you, Mr. Joffe. Is
there som	mething that you know exists that you asked for that
they are	refusing to give you?
	MR. JOFFE: Your Honor, yes. The produced few
documents	and among them only a handful, one or two, internal
correspondence.	
	THE COURT: So what do you think exists that you think
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MR. JOFFE: Even the pieces, one or two pieces that

they produced, showed that there is a number of discussions 1 2 among the principals of ICOBOX Hub related to my client. 3 THE COURT: Well what do you think -- are you looking 4 for a particular document that you think exists? MR. JOFFE: I'm looking for internal discussions on 5 6 how my client --7 I know. But they say it doesn't exist. THE COURT: So I'm trying to identify -- they say they gave you all the 8 9 correspondence. 10 MR. JOFFE: They produced one e-mail, internal e-mail, 11 and they said nothing else exists internally. 12 THE COURT: So do you have some reason to believe that 13 something else does exist? 14 MR. JOFFE: I have reason to believe that there will 15 be correspondence were involved, correspondence through all They were using e-mails. They were using --16 that period. 17 THE COURT: Well do you have any correspondence that reflect additional documents that you don't -- that you 18 requested that you didn't receive? 19 20 MR. JOFFE: Yes. We produced our correspondence from 21 my client that was going to the other side, to defendants. And 22 we produced a lot of pieces of that correspondence. It is just 23 impossible that they've not communicated amongst themselves 24 other than one e-mail that they've produced.

THE COURT: Well you say that it's impossible, but I

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don't know what's impossible. Either they say it exists or they say it doesn't exist. At this point in time the letter that I have basically says that they produced everything and they don't have anything. And I'm not the Wizard of Oz. I can't tell them to produce something that doesn't exist.

So I'm trying to get from you, you say you know something exists and they're hiding it or refusing to give it to you, then I'll order them to give it to you. But I'm not sure what the two of you are fighting about.

Is there some particular set of documents that you're fighting about or you just think that there must be something more than what you got?

MR. JOFFE: They didn't produce anything that related to my client's hiring, his termination, his complaint --

THE COURT: So what do you think exists?

MR. JOFFE: I think there are internal e-mails or texts among defendants who decided to terminate my client in retaliation. And I asked for them several times. And what I got back from defendants is that well if they are lost or missing or destroyed then tough luck we cannot recreate them.

THE COURT: But the letter that I received said that they didn't represent that they were destroyed. They represented that they don't exist.

MR. JOFFE: Well the e-mail that I quote in the letter from Mr. Leonov said either they're missing or destroyed or

lost we cannot create them.

THE COURT: Do you have a document, an example of a document that you know exists that they should have produced that you didn't get so I can get some idea what you think is out there.

MR. JOFFE: The one document that they produced, one internal e-mail refers to that they had week-long discussions about this matter amongst themselves and they are thinking what to do and they decided that they will restructure and terminate, all that. Nothing -- none of those discussions produced in any text or e-mail form. And they communicated amongst themselves by text and e-mails. We know that because at least one --

THE COURT: So what do you want me to do? I'm not sure what you want me to do.

MR. JOFFE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: If such e-mails and texts exist, surely I can order them to turn them over. But if they say that they don't exist the only thing I could do is sanction them if later on you find or show me that they do exist and that they are hiding them or something.

MR. JOFFE: In our subsequent correspondence with Mr. Leonov he kept referring to: Oh, I can ask for my clients to look for internal e-mails, or I can ask them to look for internal texts and documents and see what they can produce. So

even I think Mr. Leonov understands that there ought to be communications on the subject.

Your Honor, the lawsuit was filed shortly after the termination and retaliation and they knew that the litigation was coming right there when he was terminated. So it wasn't like there was a delay when such e-mails could have been --

THE COURT: I understand all that. But my question still is: What do you want me to do? I'm trying to assist you. What do you want me to do? What do you want me to order them to do?

MR. JOFFE: To compel them to produce those documents or to say that they were missing or destroyed and then I will have spoliation --

THE COURT: But I thought that the letter said that those documents don't exist.

MR. JOFFE: I will pull the letter. I think I have it. And I will quote Mr. Leonov's e-mail saying that if the documents -- well, the initial production from them was I think 14 documents and just one e-mail. And when I raised the issue -- and we produced thousand or something or more correspondence in support. And when I asked what other -- where are all the e-mails, where are the discussions, I got back the response that they -- either lost or missing or destroyed. And if they were, we cannot produce them.

THE COURT: So what do you --

MR. JOFFE: So I kept insisting that we need some documents.

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THE COURT: Well you don't need some documents if they don't exist.

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MR. JOFFE: If they don't exist, they were destroyed in anticipation of litigation because --

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THE COURT: Well, I don't know that. That's a different issue.

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The issue I have right now is you want me to tell them to produce documents. They say that they produced all the documents they have, that you're asking for documents that don't exist.

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MR. JOFFE: I'm not sure they don't exist, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well I'm not sure either. But I can only

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go by what they say. If you can prove that they do exist, then

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I can sanction them. But if their representation is they

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produced all the documents and they produced all the

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correspondence that you've requested, obviously, minimally they

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will be precluded from using it in their defense and they may be sanctioned even further if it turns out that they do have

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these documents and they misrepresented to the Court that they

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don't exist.

As I say, I'm very happy to tell them that it's my order that they produce those documents if they exist, but I

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don't know what else I can do beyond that at this point unless

you can demonstrate to me that you know that there's a particular document that you should have gotten in response and that document should be among other documents that they didn't produce. But I don't see you -- I mean I don't know if there's a particular document that you can identify that they have that they're refusing to give you.

MR. JOFFE: I'm unable to identify which document they didn't produce because their production was such meager, I can't point out that there was some piece of correspondence missing. There's nothing to go on.

However, your Honor, then after I take deposition, in the absence of documents, I'll be able to, hopefully, to pinpoint the documents.

THE COURT: Obviously, whatever discussions they had they were not in writing you have the opportunity to depose those witnesses with regard to those discussions and they have the responsibility to produce those relevant documents if those documents exist and make a good faith effort to locate those documents or at least to be able to affirmatively say whether those documents exist or not.

Mr. Leonov, were there documents that the two of you are fighting about?

MR. LEONOV: Your Honor, that's the thing. We are not fighting about those.

I also made that point of what Mr. Joffe is referring

to. I explained that if there were handwritten notes, I don't know what they are.

As far as the e-mails, he's correct. I went to my clients and I told them: If you have something that you can give me, go to your e-mails and make a search for Morozov, and whatever it is, give to me, and I will give to Mr. Joffe. We did that as well.

As far as the documents we produced, we did not produce just one e-mail. And that e-mail, along with others, show communications. But there is nothing else that I can give you which doesn't exist. We don't have any other e-mails and that's about it.

THE COURT: So you've produced all documents responsive to this request?

MR. LEONOV: Even documents that just mention
Mr. Morozov. We have nothing else to produce regarding his
request. As far as communication.

As far as destroying documents before litigation. We did not. We even produced documents which were way before. So we did not do that. My client did not do that. We don't have anything else -- we're not hiding anything. It's not in our interests to do that.

THE COURT: Well, the only thing I can do is accept your representations with regard to that. If it turns out that your clients do have other information and they either

misstated it --

MR. LEONOV: And they're aware of it.

THE COURT: -- and they come across something that they didn't think they had, then they should produce it right away.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ LEONOV: We are well aware of that. We are aware of the consequences and so am I.

I've spoken to them numerous times and I can represent to you that we produced all the documents that we have. They are looking for a particular document which states we terminated Mr. Morozov because of retaliation; if we have it, we would produce it, but we do not.

THE COURT: Then I'm going to assume at this point that you produced all the documents in your client's possession that were responsive to the request.

MR. LEONOV: To the best of my knowledge, that's correct.

THE COURT: And if it turns out that that's not the case, then we can address it again.

MR. LEONOV: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: But your clients have made sure that they've made a thorough search for all the documents and there are no further documents that they have in their possession that are responsive to the request for communications.

MR. LEONOV: Certainly.

THE COURT: Mr. Joffe, you can raise this issue again if you can give me some evidence that there's some other documents out there.

MR. JOFFE: Thank you, your Honor.

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My point is always that it's only a genuine discovery dispute if you can say to me I've asked the other side for X and they have refused. So I don't hear them saying that. I don't hear you saying that they've refused to give me something. I hear them saying that they gave you whatever they have and they don't have anything more. Sometimes that makes sense. Sometimes it doesn't make sense. But if that's the reality, then there's not much else I can do at this stage unless you can demonstrate that there is evidence that they have additional documents that they should have produced to you; and if you do, the first thing you should do is show that to Mr. Leonov. If you have some correspondence in your file that you say should have been produced and you can show him what it is that you have and he can go back and confront his client with it, then we can make some more progress. But otherwise, as long as the representation is that this is all the documents that exist and they're not refusing to give you anything and they produced all the documents in their possession, I can only rely on that until and unless there's evidence to the contrary.

MR. JOFFE: Understand. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. LEONOV: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Joffe, let me hear you with regard to your motion for an order of attachment.

I guess the way I want to start the focus is that you have a number of defendants, and I'm not quite sure exactly what property of whom -- whose property that you want to attach. So why don't you give me some idea of what you think exists and where you think these things are located and why you think that there's a basis to attach any one or more of these defendants' contents in a court proceeding.

MR. JOFFE: Federal Rule 64(a) allows for revenue attachment if it's available under state law. And New York law provides for attachment under CPLR Section 6201.

And there are two bases for attachment that are relevant for our case. One is 6201 subsection (1) that provides for attachment could be ordered against defendant who is a nondomiciliary outside of the state or foreign corporation outside of the state. And another Section 6201 subsection (3) provides for attachment where there is — where a defendant dissipates or removes the property with an intent either to defraud his creditors or to frustrate the enforcement of the eventual judgment. And we are looking for attachment under either of these sections. Both grounds apply to our case.

As far as the conditions for granting the attachment, we believe we've satisfied them. And they are, briefly, there

are four conditions. First, a plaintiff seeking an attachment should have a cause of action for a money judgment; second, there ought to be likelihood of success on the merits; third, one of the grounds for attachment, which I just mentioned two of them under CPLR, should apply; and fourth, that the amount of the attachment exceeds all the known counterclaims. And we in our briefs, your Honor, we show that we satisfy all of those elements and grounds for attachment.

The thing is last year about this time defendants hired my clients to work for a three-year commitment to work as the CEO of this ICOBOX Hub, Inc. which defendants decided to open in the United States and to develop into an incubator of initial coin offering, coin offerings. It was quite an ambitious project. They had a business model that projected hundreds of millions of dollars that the ICOBOX Hub will be making. And the financial model and the budget contemplated \$3 million investment from shareholders of ICOBOX Hub, Inc.

So my client was retained by defendants. He signed a three-year deal with them. And the basic deal was \$325,000 a year, plus there was 6 percent of EBITDA, stock, and two percent per year of equity in the company, plus all the perks, executive perks and so forth.

THE COURT: Who do you say that he signed the contract with, because you have a number of defendants here and the -- I see the employment agreement and the service agreement are with

ICOBOX Hub, Inc. not with regard to the other individual 1 2 defendants. They were signed by ICOBOX Hub and 3 MR. JOFFE: Right. 4 its CEO Nickolay Evdokimov. These are direct contracting 5 parties. The other defendants either -- the other defendants 6 7 are shareholders of ICOBOX Hub, Inc. 8 ICOBOX Hub, Inc. was -- the U.S. entity was incorporated by defendants in Delaware and had an address in 9 10 New York. It was the only U.S. entity that the other 11 defendants used to start this U.S. operation. It was a wholly 12 owned subsidiary of ICOBOX LLC which was a Cayman Island 13 entity. 14 THE COURT: The agreement, as I see it, is between 15 Mr. Morozov and ICOBOX Hub, Inc. 16 MR. JOFFE: Correct, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Give me a better idea of why MEM 18 Consulting, Inc. is a plaintiff and why the other individuals are defendants. 19 20 MR. JOFFE: MEM Consulting, Inc. is the plaintiff 21 because MEM Consulting, Inc. is Mr. Morozov's financial 22 consulting company. 23

THE COURT: So what does that have to do with an employment agreement?

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MR. JOFFE: The way they structured -- the deal that

they made is that they had an employment agreement with Mr. Morozov and then a services agreement with his company MEM Consulting, Inc.

THE COURT: So you say that the employment agreement was with him individually and the service agreement was with MEM Consulting, Inc.

MR. JOFFE: Correct, your Honor.

And on the other hand there was ICOBOX Hub, Inc. its CEO Evodokimov and the other defendants are shareholders of ICOBOX Hub, Inc. and they're partners by virtue of New York business corporation or Section 630 that says that the ten largest shareholders of a New York corporation that is a foreign corporation and -- sorry, I misspoke. Ten largest shareholders of a foreign corporation are liable for all the debts and wages and salaries.

THE COURT: I know. Two things I have concern about.

One, doesn't -- that doesn't apply to exempt employees. That doesn't apply to the CEO of the company. That applies to nonexempt employees, those rules.

And also that -- under those statutes they're liable for the services already rendered. They're not liable for future contractual obligations.

MR. JOFFE: Well the statute said they are liable for all the debts.

THE COURT: Right. So that's the other thing. Your

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client was -- well, it doesn't say they're liable for the debt.
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      It says they're liable for the services that have been rendered
      by those employees.
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               MR. JOFFE: I have the exact language of the statute.
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      I can --
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               THE COURT: Sure. I have it too. Where are you
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      looking?
               MR. JOFFE:
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                          I'm looking at my reply brief.
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                          And you're citing which statute?
               THE COURT:
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               MR. JOFFE: I'm citing New York Business Corporation
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      Law 630 which provides that the ten largest shareholders of
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      every domestic corporation.
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                          OK. But it says when --
               THE COURT:
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                          Shall jointly and severally be personally
               MR. JOFFE:
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      liable for all debts, wages or salaries due and owing --
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               THE COURT: Right. I'm not quite sure what you
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      claim -- there aren't -- it says when the unpaid services were
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     performed in the state.
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               What services do you say one of the plaintiffs
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     provided that was not paid for?
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               MR. JOFFE: Well, your Honor, the only payment that he
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      received for everything was onetime cash payment of $25,000, I
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     believe, which he received.
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               THE COURT:
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MR. JOFFE: Which didn't even -- well.

1 THE COURT: But he only worked a month. 2 MR. JOFFE: He worked for --3 You said he was terminated on February 9. THE COURT: 4 What happened, your Honor -- right. He MR. JOFFE: 5 worked for -- he was terminated on February 9. There was still 6 some back and forth with them. 7 THE COURT: But wasn't he paid for all of the time 8 between January 1 or whatever the date was that they signed the 9 agreement and February 9? He was paid for that month period, 10 wasn't he? 11 MR. JOFFE: Your Honor at that time --12 THE COURT: For any services he provided during that 13 month --14 MR. JOFFE: He was paid -- well, I'm not sure. He was 15 paid in cash at that time. He worked for a month. He had relocation expenses. He to move the family from New York to --16 17 THE COURT: I know but that's different -- that's not 18 defined as paid -- unpaid services. If you say that they're 19 obligated to pay his living expenses or moving expenses. 20 That's not what's defined as unpaid services under the statute. 21 Unpaid services means if I am an employee of the 22 company and I worked on Monday and then nobody paid me for the 23 work that I did, then I could go to the shareholders and say: 24 Wait a minute. You guys owe me the money for the work that I

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did.

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               I don't see here where you say that he performed
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      services that he wasn't paid for.
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               You say that he had a contract that obligated them or
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      whoever signed the contract to make certain payments. But
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      those weren't services provided.
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               The services -- the services that were provided were
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      services provided between -- when was -- remind me, January --
                          January 1.
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               MR. JOFFE:
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               THE COURT: -- first was the signing of the contract,
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      right?
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               MR. JOFFE:
                          Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And you allege in the complaint that
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      February 9 was his last day of employment.
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               MR. JOFFE: It was when the termination happened, your
      Honor.
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               THE COURT: So it was the last day of employment,
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      right?
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               MR. JOFFE: Yes.
                          I'm not going to debate that with the two
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               THE COURT:
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      of you whether he was fired or whether he wasn't fired. But as
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      of February 9 he was no longer working for the company, right?
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               MR. JOFFE: Correct.
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               THE COURT:
                          He was paid -- I'm not even sure what work
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You don't claim they owe him money for services he

he was paid for for the first month.

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rendered prior to February 9? 1 2 MR. JOFFE: Well, your Honor, just -- the payment he received was just cash. 3 4 THE COURT: I know but that was payment for his 5 services as the CEO. 6 MR. JOFFE: Well I don't know -- at that time -- your 7 Honor he --8 THE COURT: What are you alleging? That's what I'm 9 trying to ask you. 10 MR. JOFFE: At that time whenever he got paid that 11 money he already had relocated to San Francisco from New York 12 and under the contract the company owed him to pay for 13 relocation expenses. 14 THE COURT: But that's a contractual obligation. That's not -- under the business law that doesn't in and of 15 itself constitute unpaid services. 16 17 MR. JOFFE: My point was only that when they give them 18 the packet of cash. 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 They owed him his salary for that month. MR. JOFFE: 21 They owed him relocation expenses. 22 THE COURT: But you do not claim that he was not paid 23 his salary for that month. 24 MR. JOFFE: All he got is that packet of money.

THE COURT: But he was paid his salary for that month.

You don't allege that he wasn't paid his salary for that month. 1 2 MR. JOFFE: Well he certainly wasn't issued any check 3 that says it's a payroll and whatever. He just got from a 4 secretary, he got a pack of money for the months in which he already spent ten thousand of his own. 5 6 THE COURT: What did he receive that money for? Are 7 you claiming that they owe him --8 MR. JOFFE: They owe him both for his salary -- they 9 owed him business expenses that he incurred. They owed him relocation. So when they gave him one set of cash, you know, 10 11 it's not --12 THE COURT: What I'm trying to understand is the only 13 theory that you have against the other defendants is that they 14 were shareholders. That's the only theory that you have 15 against those other defendants. 16 MR. JOFFE: No. 17 THE COURT: They are the largest shareholders so they should be liable for the services that he rendered for which he 18 19 was not paid. That's your argument. 20 And I'm trying to understand from your complaint what 21 services you claim that he rendered for what period of time

that you claim that he was not paid.

MR. JOFFE: Well that month and month-and-a-half or month and the week.

> THE COURT: Which month?

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MR. JOFFE: January and part of February. He worked constantly.

THE COURT: Wasn't he paid? He was paid.

Because you even allege that he -- part of your claim that he was paid but he wasn't paid timely. That's part of your claim. You claim that he was paid.

MR. JOFFE: He was paid onetime cash payment. That's it.

THE COURT: I know. That's what I'm asking. That's what I haven't got from you.

He worked from January 2018 to February -- January 1, 2018 when he signed the contract to be the CEO you claim that he worked until February 9 when he was terminated.

MR. JOFFE: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't see anywhere in this complaint where you say he was not paid those wages.

As a matter of fact, paragraph 83 says defendant failed to pay the wages on time on the following occasions.

You say that the January 15 wages were paid on February 3. And you say the January 31 wages were paid on February 3.

And then you say the February 15 and the February 25, 2018 wages were not paid at all. But that's after he no longer worked there. Right.

MR. JOFFE: Right. Well he worked there --

THE COURT: So what wages did he earn after February 9?

MR. JOFFE: After February 9 he -- well, the agreement provided that there was a 30-day notice.

THE COURT: I know but wages. We're talking about wages. You're trying to assert a statutory claim against a shareholder. That's what I want to focus on first.

I understand more clearly your claims, contractual claims against the company. And we can discuss whether or not Evdokimov, whether or not he has any personal liability as a signatory to the contract.

But at this point when I'm looking at the complaint and the papers, it seems that your client signed an agreement with the company; didn't sign a personal agreement with any of the individuals. His contract was with the company. The company, whatever you say -- whoever you say owes him money pursuant to a contract, the company owes him money pursuant to the contract.

If you want to extend that to shareholders, you have to do two things. You have to convince me: One, that he's not an exempt employee because he's the CEO of the company. My understanding is the law that you want to apply doesn't apply to the CEO of the company. It applies to the employees and nonexempt employees of the company if they provide services. He's not — he's not one of those kinds of employees. And

two --1 2 Under New York Labor Law I think. MR. JOFFE: THE COURT: Again, as I said, even if I were to accept 3 that, in this complaint I don't see which wages you say that he 4 5 earned that he was not paid for as an employee when he was employee of the company. 6 7 You say in paragraph 83, you say he was paid his 8 January 15 wages and his January 31 wages. So which wages do you say he wasn't paid? 9 10 MR. JOFFE: Well even on this one he wasn't -- until 11 February 9, the first week or two weeks of February he wasn't That's not paid wages. 12 paid. 13 THE COURT: He was not paid. 14 He was not paid for February -- even if he MR. JOFFE: was -- even if the termination was on February 9, he was not 15 16 paid for February. 17 THE COURT: So what period of time do you claim that 18 he was paid for? 19 Well he was paid one sum, one lump sum MR. JOFFE: 20 and -- that was January. So for January he was paid. 21 THE COURT: OK. 22 MR. JOFFE: But again -- well, right. He was paid --23 THE COURT: So you say he was paid for January.

for February, at least for the first biweekly wages, he wasn't

He was paid for January. He wasn't paid

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MR. JOFFE:

paid many of them.

THE COURT: That's what I'm trying to understand.

MR. JOFFE: Well February, please, my concern with January, yes, we say he was paid, but there was not just salary payments that were due to him in January. And when he got that cash payment, you can call it wage or salary, but you could also call it business expense.

THE COURT: But the statute does not cover business expense.

MR. JOFFE: For the purposes of the statute his salary for first part of February were not paid. And even for the purposes of the statute that's sufficient, your Honor, I believe, to bring Section 630 into play and have shareholders of the company liable for that.

THE COURT: But isn't the amount of money he was paid the amount of money that would have covered the February -- to February 9.

MR. JOFFE: To February 9 that would have --

THE COURT: I mean the amount of his salary was prorated through the date that --

MR. JOFFE: Right. He was prorated. I think it would have been probably twelve, thirteen thousand dollars. I have to calculate that. But yes. So -- yes.

THE COURT: And also I'm not quite sure what is -- give me a little bit more of the facts of what he did. My

understanding is he was signed up to be the CEO.

MR. JOFFE: Yep.

THE COURT: That they were supposed to start this company. They never did the financing to get the company off the ground. So what is it -- what kind of work was he doing?

MR. JOFFE: He immediately -- well, the first thing he started to do, because that was the first thing they want him to do, is to find good office space. And he was in negotiations with Trump Tower, Trump Organization in New York. They wanted to rent Trump Tower suite.

THE COURT: I thought he was going to work in California.

MR. JOFFE: And at the same time they wanted to open an office in San Francisco and Sansome, 755 Sansome Street. Big, high end, you know, real estate offices. So he was shuttling between New York and San Francisco trying to rent both offices. He was in negotiations with Trump Organization including Trump CFO.

THE COURT: Up until when?

MR. JOFFE: That was in January.

THE COURT: Right. But he was paid for January. See, again that's where I keep coming back. He was paid his salary in January. So did he do any other work in February?

MR. JOFFE: He was, your Honor. I'm sure. We produced tons of documents on that and discovery will show he

was working. He was working in January and February. He had financial people, he had lawyers he was working with. He had a lot of computer programmers who work on -- technical people.

THE COURT: When?

MR. JOFFE: In February. All in February. He was working as the CEO. He moved from New York to San Francisco and continued working out of San Francisco offices when they told them that his plan. And the idea was, your Honor, there are financial models we'll put in as exhibits, the idea was to grow this U.S. side corporation quickly and dramatically. It was projected to make a hundred million dollars or so by 2020. So they wanted to build that big corporation and he was working on that, obtaining people, getting documentation, contracts.

THE COURT: So are these other individual defendants, are they shareholders of ICO Hub -- BOX Hub or shareholders of ICOBOX?

MR. JOFFE: They are -- some of them are shareholders -- direct shareholders of ICO Hub and some of them are shareholders --

THE COURT: Where do you allege that? Because you say the shareholder defendant, but it's unclear to me, because in the first paragraph you say that defendant ICOBOX Hub, Inc. and then its parent company, the Cayman Island entity is ICOBOX, their main shareholders, the shareholder defendants. So whose main shareholders, ICOBOX or ICOBOX Hub?

1 MR. JOFFE: They are shareholders of ICOBOX. 2 THE COURT: The parent company. 3 MR. JOFFE: ICOBOX, the parent company. 4 THE COURT: But your theory is that they should be 5 held responsible for his salary because they are shareholders. 6 But they're not shareholders of the company that hired him. 7 mean I don't know if they are. You don't allege that. You're not claiming that they're shareholders of the company ICOBOX 8 9 Hub. That's who you say in Count One the employment agreement 10 is with. MR. JOFFE: 11 We also allege that Mr. -- defendant 12 Evdokimov was a shareholder of ICOBOX Hub. 13 THE COURT: Where do you allege that? 14 MR. JOFFE: That's paragraph 22 of our first amended 15 complaint, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: 22? 17 MR. JOFFE: 22. 18 THE COURT: I see that. So you allege in 22 that he is the CEO of ICOBOX Hub's parent company, defendant ICOBOX and 19 20 a shareholder of defendant ICOBOX Hub within the meaning of the 21 business law. So I see that. But you don't make that 22 allegation with regard to any of these other defendants. 23 MR. JOFFE: With respect to others, your Honor, in 24 paragraph 20. 25 THE COURT: 20.

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1 MR. JOFFE: Yes. Paragraph 20 of the amended 2 complaint. 3 OK. Twenty does not say that any of these THE COURT: defendants are shareholders of ICOBOX Hub. 4 5 MR. JOFFE: Right. But we do claim that they are 6 offshore shell company ICOBOX was the alter ego of those 7 shareholders and ultimate beneficial owners because they all used ICOBOX as an entity to actually control and do business in 8 9 the United States --10 THE COURT: I know but you don't say --11 MR. JOFFE: ICOBOX Hub. 12 THE COURT: No, you don't say ICOBOX Hub. You don't 13 say that anybody is an alter ego of ICOBOX Hub. 14 MR. JOFFE: Of ICOBOX the Cayman Island. 15 THE COURT: That's a different company. 16 MR. JOFFE: Which ICOBOX --17 THE COURT: Is the parent company. MR. JOFFE: -- is the owner of --18 THE COURT: Yeah, but that doesn't make them liable 19 20 for the subsidiary as shareholders, because they're 21 shareholders of the parent company. You can't advance that 22 theory, can you? 23 And you're not saying that they're alter egos of 24 ICOBOX Hub.

MR. JOFFE: They are alter egos of ICOBOX Hub

1 shareholder ICOBOX Cayman Island. 2 THE COURT: No. ICOBOX Cayman Island. You say they're shareholders of ICOBOX Cayman Island? 3 4 MR. JOFFE: Right. 5 THE COURT: But you don't have any contract with 6 ICOBOX Cayman Island. 7 MR. JOFFE: We don't. But ICOBOX Cayman Island is a shareholder of ICOBOX Hub. 8 9 If ICOBOX Hub is liable for wages or salaries, so 10 that's for the unperformed service, Section 630 of New York 11 Business Law makes ICOBOX Cayman Island liable for those unpaid 12 services. 13 THE COURT: I know but that doesn't -- under the 14 statute that doesn't make the shareholders of the parent 15 company liable for the debts of its subsidiary. That's not 16 what the statute says. 17 MR. JOFFE: No, your Honor. The individual 18 shareholders of ICOBOX Cayman Island company -- ICOBOX Cayman 19 company is alter ego of those Russian investors. So the Cayman 20 Island company --21 THE COURT: I know but the Cayman Island company, you 22

don't have a contract with the Cayman Island company.

MR. JOFFE: We don't have a contract with Cayman Island company. We have a contract with U.S. company.

> THE COURT: Right.

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               MR. JOFFE: Which was -- your Honor, it was created
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      for -- existed for several months and then it was abandoned.
 3
                           I understand that.
               THE COURT:
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               MR. JOFFE: And who created it was this group of
 5
      shareholders.
6
               THE COURT:
                          Right.
 7
                          Who were acting through their Cayman
               MR. JOFFE:
8
      offshore --
9
               THE COURT: I know. But you don't say other than, the
10
      one I keep mispronouncing his name, Nickolay, I'll call him
11
      Nickolay. You don't claim that anybody else other than
12
      Nickolay is a shareholder of ICOBOX Hub. You say that Nickolay
13
      is a shareholder of ICOBOX Hub and you say that -- I'm not even
14
      sure you say that ICOBOX is a shareholder of ICOBOX Hub.
15
               MR. JOFFE: I believe I do, your Honor.
               THE COURT: That would make sense.
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17
               MR. JOFFE: It would make sense.
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               THE COURT: Is that here in the complaint?
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               MR. JOFFE:
                          I'm sure I allege that ICOBOX Cayman
20
      Island is the parent company.
21
               THE COURT: Right. You say the parent company. But
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      you don't say specifically that they are shareholders.
23
               MR. JOFFE:
                          I'm trying to find it.
24
                          What theory do you have against ICOBOX as
               THE COURT:
25
      defendant? Why does ICOBOX owe your client money? Under which
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theory?

MR. JOFFE: ICOBOX is the immediate parent of ICOBOX Hub and its shareholder and --

THE COURT: But I don't see any subsidiary parent liability. That's not the basis.

MR. JOFFE: OK. I found paragraph 29.

THE COURT: 29.

MR. JOFFE: ICOBOX Hub was a shareholder of defendant ICOBOX Hub -- sorry. Defendant ICOBOX was a shareholder of defendant ICOBOX Hub.

THE COURT: OK. I see.

MR. JOFFE: So. I'm sorry. I have it there.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JOFFE: So the theory is, the liability, how to get to the shareholders is that if — well certain shareholders ICOBOX and Evdokimov are alleged to be shareholders of ICOBOX, Inc. That would bring them within the ambit of a New York Section 630. Others, once they removed the shareholders of Cayman Island company, and we allege that there is an alter ego theory, that the shareholders of ICOBOX Cayman Island company are alter ego of that company and vice versa. So they would be liable by virtue of the alter ego liability.

THE COURT: Except I'm not sure which count that is. Which claim is that?

MR. JOFFE: This is the claim for unpaid wages and for

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retaliation under New York labor law and fair standards.
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               THE COURT:
                          Count Four?
               MR. JOFFE: It's Count Four, your Honor. And it's
 3
      also retaliatory discharge as well, your Honor. But that's
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5
      something -- we're talking about wages only, so.
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               THE COURT: All right. I understand your first
 7
      contract theory is the employment agreement against ICOBOX Hub.
      That's a claim simply against ICOBOX Hub.
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9
               MR. JOFFE: Yes. Contract breach, yes.
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               THE COURT:
                          And then the second breach of contract is.
11
               MR. JOFFE:
                          Is services.
12
               THE COURT:
                          The service agreement between MEM.
13
               MR. JOFFE:
                          The contractual party of ICOBOX Hub, Inc.
14
               THE COURT:
                          So that's MEM and ICOBOX, Hub.
               MR. JOFFE:
15
                          Yes, your Honor. Those are Counts One and
16
      Two.
17
               THE COURT: And Count Three is your failure to pay
18
      timely wages. And it's unclear to me in what way these wages
19
     were untimely.
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               MR. JOFFE: Well, the wage is considered untimely when
21
      it's not paid.
22
               THE COURT:
                          When?
23
               MR. JOFFE:
                           Biweekly under the New York labor law.
24
               THE COURT:
                          So what wages --
25
                          So if you delay, under New York law -- and
               MR. JOFFE:
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under FLSA, let's say if you have to pay biweekly and there is 1 2 a delay in payment of wages that's considered to be delayed. 3 THE COURT: Where does it say that he was supposed to 4 be paid biweekly? 5 MR. JOFFE: Your Honor, in the -- first of all, under 6 FLSA it's as a matter of contractual -- sorry, as a matter of 7 I can cite -- I can bring cases. THE COURT: But that doesn't apply to the CEO of the 8 company. He's the CEO of the company. These rules don't apply 9 10 to him. If he was simply an employee of the company --11 MR. JOFFE: I believe New York labor law applies. 12 THE COURT: As the CEO of the company? He's the 13 managerial -- I mean he's head of the company. 14 Well, he still gets paid. MR. JOFFE: Right. But he doesn't get paid pursuant 15 THE COURT: to the New York business law. 16 17 MR. JOFFE: No. 18 THE COURT: He's an exempt employee. He gets paid as 19 a managerial employee. 20 MR. JOFFE: Right. But under New York labor law there 21 is no such exemption for -- I don't believe there is an 22 exemption for CEOs. There is -- I grant there is an exemption 23 for minimum wage and overtime pay. 24 THE COURT: But he's not that kind of employee.

not an hourly employee. He's not entitled to minimum wage.

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He's not -- he's a salaried, exempt employee.

So that's what I'm trying to understand, under what theory does he have to say, well, I was entitled to get paid every two weeks?

And doesn't your complaint say he got paid?

Where is he entitled to get paid every two weeks?

That's not in his employment contract.

MR. JOFFE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Because you say the January 15 wages. I'm not sure what you mean by the January 15 wages.

He signed the contract on January 1. You're saying because he signed the contract on January 1 he had the right to be paid.

MR. JOFFE: Biweekly.

THE COURT: Where do you get that? In either law or in contract? Where does it say that -- I don't get paid biweekly. I get paid every month. I can't say I'm entitled to be paid biweekly. Where do you get that entitlement from?

And as a matter of fact many employees don't get paid until the week after the two weeks that they've earned. They don't get paid before they earn it. A lot of employees who have a week lag in terms of their payments.

MR. JOFFE: That's right. We're not alleging that he should have gotten paid on January 1.

THE COURT: When are you alleging he should have

1 gotten paid? That's what I'm trying to understand. 2 We say biweekly. MR. JOFFE: THE COURT: But you say he should have gotten paid on 3 4 January 15 for working on January 14. 5 MR. JOFFE: For the first biweekly period. 6 THE COURT: Where do you get that from? That's what 7 I'm trying to figure out. 8 That's not in his contract, is it? And that's not in the statute that if he works -- if he works for a two-week 9 10 period that the day after the two-week period he's supposed to 11 get a paycheck. 12 Where do you get that? 13 MR. JOFFE: Your Honor --14 THE COURT: Is that the way you get your paycheck? 15 MR. JOFFE: No. I don't get paychecks.

THE COURT: Right. That's what I'm saying.

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He's the CEO of the company. You're saying to me that he was entitled to be paid for the first two weeks that he worked the day after the first two weeks passed. I don't know where you get that from. What contract or statutory language entitles him to that payment on that date?

MR. JOFFE: Your Honor I cannot find the authority to give you right now but there is an authority under both

New York law and under FLSA that says that -- FLSA itself does not define what is the timely wages. I will have to say both

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New York labor law and FLSA refer to timely or untimely wages.
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               THE COURT:
                           Right.
                          FLSA does not specifically define what
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               MR. JOFFE:
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      timely wages is. But there is case law and I just -- I can't,
 5
      unfortunately, give you reference right now. And there is CFR
6
      provision that says that wages are considered timely when they
 7
      are paid biweekly.
8
               I believe in New York labor law it is also specified
9
      what timely wages is.
10
               THE COURT: So what do you claim --
11
               MR. JOFFE:
                          Must statutes turn on timely wages.
12
               THE COURT: So what do you claim the timely wages
13
      would be? What would be untimely?
14
                          Biweekly. Every two weeks, your Honor.
               MR. JOFFE:
               THE COURT:
15
                          So are you saying that if he worked for
16
      two weeks from January 1 to January 14 he was entitled by
17
      statute to be paid on January 15?
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                          That would be a timely wage, your Honor.
               MR. JOFFE:
               THE COURT:
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                          Why wouldn't January 15 be a timely wage?
20
                          Well because --
               MR. JOFFE:
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               THE COURT: Or January 16?
22
               Or February 1?
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               Where do you get --
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               MR. JOFFE:
                          I'm getting that --
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               THE COURT: Where do you draw the line?
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MR. JOFFE:

MR. JOFFE: I'm getting at the fact that both statutes, New York State, and federal, refer to timely payment of wages. THE COURT: Right. MR. JOFFE: And there ought to be an understanding what is timely. THE COURT: And what is your understanding? MR. JOFFE: My understanding is it's two weeks, biweekly payments. And I'll be happy to follow up with --THE COURT: I know, but if I worked on January 14, if you're arguing that I should have been paid on January 15 for the work I did on January 14. That's not two weeks. one day. MR. JOFFE: Correct. THE COURT: How is that not timely? If I get paid on January 15 for the work I did on January 14? MR. JOFFE: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: So -- but that's not two weeks. So you're saying -- that's two weeks from January 1. But that's not two weeks from February 14. So how is it that you're alleging that he wasn't paid timely for the work he did on February 14 if --MR. JOFFE: Sorry. January probably. THE COURT: January.

THE COURT: But doesn't -- let me go back to another

For February he wasn't paid at all.

issue. The statute lays out definitions. And it lays out the definition of employees who are covered by these statutes. The definition of employee excludes executive, administrative, or professional capacity. Right. Executive — work in a bona fide executive capacity means work by an individual whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which such individual is employed or of a customary recognized department or subdivision.

He's not defined as an employee under the statute.

MR. JOFFE: Your Honor are you quoting from FLSA?

THE COURT: I'm quoting from the New York State Labor Law. The New York State Labor Law says that the labor law covers employees. And Section 142-2.14 defines employee as someone other than an executive, administrator -- who works as an executive, administrator or in a professional capacity.

That's the capacity your guy worked for. He's not a low level employee. He's the CEO. As the CEO he doesn't fall under the definition of employee under the statute.

And there's similar language under -- I think there's similar language under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

But let me just refocus one second and then I can hear from the other side.

Tell me what you want me to seize. My understanding is, first of all, that the company that he was employed by ICOBOX Hub, Inc. has no assets; is that correct?

1 MR. JOFFE: They put it in dissolution, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: They put it in what? 3 In dissolution. They say they dissolved MR. JOFFE: 4 it. 5 THE COURT: I know but did it have any assets? 6 MR. JOFFE: It has no assets. 7 THE COURT: That's not my point. My point is you want me to seize the defendants' assets. The defendant ICOBOX Hub 8 9 has no assets. 10 MR. JOFFE: That's right, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: So there is no assets that they are in 12 possession of that you've identified that you want me to seize. 13 MR. JOFFE: Not from ICOBOX Hub which has none. 14 its CEO, Evdokimov, its CEO shareholder, has sets. We listed 15 them --THE COURT: He has a home and bank accounts in the 16 17 United States. MR. JOFFE: He has a home in California and he has 18 some assets in California and he has shares --19 20 THE COURT: So what evidence is there that he intends 21 to either defraud recovery of assets from him if there's a 22 judgment against him or to frustrate the recovery by the 23 plaintiff if the plaintiff were to get a personal judgment 24 against him? 25 MR. JOFFE: Well, the evidence --

THE COURT: As you said or that he intends he's	
taken some action to dissipate his assets to make them	
unavailable to satisfy a judgment. Because, as you	
articulated, that's part of the requirement.	
What evidence is there that he or any of these	
individuals are taking such things?	
MR. JOFFE: Well, your Honor, as soon as we've	
commenced the lawsuit they've abandoned the offices they worked	
for they worked at in San Francisco. They moved personnel	
and they moved business elsewhere.	
THE COURT: When you say "they moved personnel," I'm	
not sure what you mean because I'm not sure I know that this	
company ever had any personnel.	
Did the company ever have any employees?	
MR. JOFFE: Well it had my client.	
THE COURT: Right.	
MR. JOFFE: It had people, programmers and others.	
THE COURT: That's what I'm asking. Were there	
people	
MR. JOFFE: There were people who were working there	
in that office.	
THE COURT: Which office?	
MR. JOFFE: There was an office in San Francisco.	
THE COURT: And there were employees?	

MR. JOFFE: And there were employees there.

THE COURT: And so what happened?

MR. JOFFE: Actually, the defendants themselves,

Generalova and Evdokimov and others, they worked out of that

office in San Francisco. What happened is as soon as we filed

that complaint and attempted to serve them the office was

abandoned.

THE COURT: Didn't they indicate that the office would be abandoned even before the lawsuit?

MR. JOFFE: It could have been, but the time difference was -- I mean when he was fired he said that he will litigate this issue with them. So they knew. We couldn't find them. We couldn't find it. Now they tell us the company is in dissolution and it has no assets.

THE COURT: Did the company ever have assets?

MR. JOFFE: The company, I presume, was renting something.

THE COURT: I can't presume.

MR. JOFFE: And there was -- the whole idea for this company and office was that the shareholders of the defendants will contribute \$3 million. We have it in the financial models and the term sheet. The idea -- and the contractual obligation of the company was to fund its own budget.

THE COURT: Where was that? I didn't see that.

I thought there was a provision that specifically said that if they didn't -- if the company didn't get the funding

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that the contract was void.
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               MR. JOFFE: Well, it wasn't -- it was just a breach
      because in -- I have employment agreement here. I can hand
 3
 4
      up --
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               THE COURT: I think I have it or I saw it.
6
                          It's paragraph 2.4 -- paragraph 2.4 says
               MR. JOFFE:
 7
      company shall be required to fund the company's annual budget.
               THE COURT:
                          Which company should be required?
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9
                          ICOBOX Hub. ICOBOX Hub, Inc.
               MR. JOFFE:
10
               THE COURT: So it's required to fund itself.
11
               MR. JOFFE: It was required to fund the company with
12
      the annual budget. It was not my client --
13
               THE COURT: So where was it everybody else's
14
      responsibility?
15
               Whose responsibility was it?
16
               MR. JOFFE:
                          The owners of the company.
17
               THE COURT:
                          Well where does it say that?
18
               MR. JOFFE:
                          We have --
19
               THE COURT: Who is the owner of the company?
20
                          The shareholders of the company.
               MR. JOFFE:
21
               THE COURT: I'm still not sure who the shareholders of
22
      the company are supposed to be.
23
                           Those are those Russian guys.
               MR. JOFFE:
24
               THE COURT:
                           All of these guys you still say you
25
      believe are the shareholders of ICOBOX Hub.
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1	MR. JOFFE: Not all well, ICOBOX itself.
2	Moskovsky, Generalova, Babayev, Evdokimov and Raitsin.
3	So they were posed to fund the company. He was
4	supposed to do the work. And that was the whole plan.
5	It wasn't his responsibility to raise money for the
6	budget.
7	It was going on from the get-go. The shareholders
8	said we'll fund it with \$3 million and we have it in writing.
9	THE COURT: So whose property am I supposed to seize?
10	MR. JOFFE: Well ICOBOX.
11	THE COURT: Which property?
12	MR. JOFFE: We are asking for attachment of Evdokimov.
13	Evdokimov is the main guy there. Evdokimov
14	THE COURT: What assets do you want me to seize?
15	MR. JOFFE: We have a list of assets, your Honor.
16	THE COURT: Tell me.
17	MR. JOFFE: Some real estate in California, and there
18	is some shares in various companies that he owns.
19	THE COURT: Shares in what U.S. companies?
20	MR. JOFFE: No. Not U.S. companies.
21	THE COURT: So how am I supposed to seize shares in a
22	company out of the United States?
23	MR. JOFFE: He owns them here in the United States.
24	THE COURT: He owns them here?
25	MR. JOFFE: I would believe they are not the

24

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1 companies itself. But you can have, you know, stock --2 That's what I'm asking. THE COURT: 3 MR. JOFFE: -- stock in a foreign company but you can 4 have it here. If we arrest a stock --5 THE COURT: So what evidence is there that he's taken 6 any steps to dissipate any of his assets? 7 MR. JOFFE: Well he's taken steps to dissipate all the 8 assets -- not dissipate but to discontinue any operations of 9 ICOBOX in the United States, to move everything from the United 10 States, not contribute money. THE COURT: What did he move from the United States? 11 12 I don't see that in your papers. What evidence is there that 13 he moved something from the United States to put it out of 14 reach of a judgment? 15 MR. JOFFE: Well they've already refused to fund the 16 company. 17 THE COURT: Right. That I understand. 18 MR. JOFFE: They made the company enter into 19 contracts, your Honor, and they fund zero money for the 20 company. They didn't provide any support for the company to 21 honor its obligations. So that's what they did in the 22 beginning. You don't have to move much if there was not much 23 to begin with. They told my client they will put \$3 million --

THE COURT: I understand that. And I understand the

I mean there's agreements that he signed with them.

nature of your contractual claim. But that is not evidence that they are moving assets to avoid a judgment.

MR. JOFFE: They didn't put in any assets --

THE COURT: Right. That's not hiding assets from you so you would have a judgment. It's not like they had a million dollars in the bank and then you sued them and they took the million dollars and they took it out of the bank and they sent it overseas. That's not what you're claiming. You're claiming they never had the million dollars in the bank at all in ICO Hub. They never invested the money.

MR. JOFFE: They never did, your Honor.

THE COURT: So how is that evidence that they had taken some action to $\ensuremath{\mathsf{--}}$

MR. JOFFE: OK. Right before we filed the litigation they had an office, they had people working in the United States.

THE COURT: Well if they're not going to do business -- right. They closed the office. But how is that a dissipation of assets to frustrate the judgment? Because that's the second requirement.

The first requirement, you know -- the first requirement is a likelihood of success on the merits. But the second requirement is that there's some evidence that they're trying to dissipate assets in order to defraud or frustrate recovery.

1 MR. JOFFE: That's one of the grounds. 2 THE COURT: Right. MR. JOFFE: There is another and it's an alternative 3 4 You don't have to show dissipation if you show the 5 defendant is a nondomiciliary residing out of state or foreign corporation out of state. That's independent under 6201 6 7 subsection (1) under CPLR. We don't have to show, if we qualify under 6201, that all the defendants are out of state 8 9 and foreign corporations, then we don't need separately to show 10 that there is a dissipation of assets with intent to frustrate 11 enforcement of judgment. Those are two separate grounds. 12 doesn't necessarily turn on intent to frustrate enforcement of 13 judgment. That's one point I want to make. 14 And we do show that under both CPLR Section 6201(1) as 15 a nondomiciliary foreign corporation. They all are, except for one, which is now in dissolution, has no assets and never had 16 17 any assets; yet, that's the one that entered into contractual 18 obligations in the United States. 19 THE COURT: So which defendant is a nondomiciliary? 20 MR. JOFFE: Well out of six defendants, other than 21 ICOBOX Hub, Inc., which is incorporated in Delaware. 22 THE COURT: OK. 23 MR. JOFFE: It doesn't --24 Doesn't make it a foreign --THE COURT:

MR. JOFFE: It never had an office in New York and it

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was in San Francisco.

THE COURT: I know but --

MR. JOFFE: All the rest are nondomiciliaries.

THE COURT: Except that's not the issue that we're talking about. There are no assets of ICO Hub that you want me to seize. There are no assets.

MR. JOFFE: I'm not aware of any, your Honor. We believe there aren't.

THE COURT: That's not who we're talking about. We're talking about the other defendants.

MR. JOFFE: Yes.

THE COURT: The question is: Do you have a likelihood of success against the other defendants and are you entitled to seize their property? Right?

MR. JOFFE: Right.

THE COURT: So your only argument that you're entitled to seize the property of the other individuals other than Nickolay is that they are shareholders of ICOBOX.

MR. JOFFE: Correct, your Honor.

And ICOBOX is the parent company. They are alter ego of ICOBOX Hub. ICOBOX Hub is a shareholder and parent of ICOBOX Hub, Inc. ICOBOX, Inc. is gone. We can only -- if it's dissolved, it has no assets, then obviously whatever judgment, if it's rendered in our favor, we won't be able to recover against them.

THE COURT: Then you recover against -- if you have a basis to recover against the other defendants, you recover against the other defendants.

MR. JOFFE: Yes. And the other defendants, your Honor, all of them are under CPLR 6201(1) nondomiciliaries, all of them.

THE COURT: But I'm not convinced that you have a likelihood of success against all of these other defendants. Because the only theory that I hear is that they are shareholders of the parent company. They didn't sign an agreement with your client. They didn't -- they're not bound by the contract or the service agreement. Your only theory is that I would have to accept the fact that somehow because they're shareholders, that your client, even though he's an executive, the CEO of the company, that they are liable under the business law to pay his expenses.

MR. JOFFE: We have three theories of liability in general, your Honor. One of them is unpaid wages or whatever under New York -- that's one. We have two other theories of liability, your Honor. The other theory is the contract breach and the third one is retaliation.

THE COURT: So tell me how -- tell me specifically what your client -- what protected activity your client was engaged in and what happened that one could say that these facts demonstrate retaliation, because you're very vague with

regard to that.

First of all, you say -- let me just find the paragraph in the complaint.

You say paragraph 136. You said defendants ICOBOX Hub and Nickolay terminated plaintiff following and in retaliation for his reports of defendants' violations of labor, immigration, tax and other laws.

First of all, I don't see anything that protects him with regard to immigration, tax or other laws and I'm not even sure what you're talking about.

MR. JOFFE: Well, it's all in connection with employment. There were people who worked for ICOBOX Hub without immigration status and he was complaining to defendants that it's a violation when you have --

THE COURT: I'm not sure that that's what the statute protects.

MR. JOFFE: Well --

THE COURT: It doesn't address immigration complaints. It addresses labor complaints.

MR. JOFFE: It's employment-related immigration.

THE COURT: Again, I don't even know what this means. What do you say he complained of that he was protected and you say that they fired him. What evidence is there that they fired him because he complained about something?

MR. JOFFE: Well, one, it's not necessarily evidence

but, first of all, there was a clear temporal proximity between his complaints and his being terminated.

THE COURT: So you think really just based on these facts you have a basis to believe that the reason they fired him was because he complained about immigration and tax laws.

MR. JOFFE: Well it's not that -- not because of immigration complaints, your Honor. They hired him to build the infrastructure and to build and run the company. And the common theme was that -- and we can show, if we have documents we produced at least, that every step he was trying to do things in a legal way, legally.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JOFFE: So if you have employees, they have to be paid correctly.

THE COURT: That's not what this complaint says. It doesn't say anything about that.

MR. JOFFE: The complaint says that he was -- the complaint alleges that he was complaining --

THE COURT: About violations of labor, immigration, tax and other laws. That doesn't tell me anything.

What do you say he complained about specifically that was protected by the statute?

MR. JOFFE: The employees' immigration, paragraphs 64, 65.

THE COURT: 64 and 65.

MR. JOFFE: Describe his complaints in subsection (c)
of the amended complaint. It starts with paragraph 63. It
goes on.

THE COURT: Where does this say he's complaining abou

THE COURT: Where does this say he's complaining about something?

MR. JOFFE: He is complaining saying that you need to fix this.

THE COURT: Fix what?

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MR. JOFFE: There are several employees which needs to be paid in cash. We don't have an account. Please, can we use your account. He's saying you cannot do it.

THE COURT: So you are really alleging in good faith that the reason that they fired him, terminated him, was because of the complaint he made on January 10?

MR. JOFFE: There were many complaints, your Honor. It goes on not just in January.

THE COURT: You really think that that's why they fired him?

MR. JOFFE: What we allege, your Honor, is -- well, one point is it doesn't have to be exclusive cause of --

THE COURT: What evidence is there that they fired him because of that?

It seems to me that they fired him because they didn't want to invest the money. That's what you really allege. They didn't fire him because he came and complained.

MR. JOFFE: Bitcoin, the main currency, crashed 70 percent during the period between his hiring and his firing. And at the same time, yes -- well, he was complaining, what he was saying is you have to do it in a legal way; you cannot do it illegally. You cannot take money from, you know, people who are under sanctions here.

THE COURT: So what evidence is there that their response was that because he complained that's why they fired him.

MR. JOFFE: There would never be such a --

THE COURT: Well, there could be.

MR. JOFFE: Could be. We didn't get any of the documents from the defendants to bring you. When you asking me that, your Honor, you would agree it would not be in correspondence with my client that they will say we are firing you in retaliation. It would be something internally amongst themselves. That was my point when we started this morning.

THE COURT: But there would be some circumstantial evidence. The only evidence that you want to rely upon is that you say that it was close in time.

MR. JOFFE: Your Honor, we cite cases that say that temporal proximity is a good circumstantial --

THE COURT: That's all you're relying on. There is no other evidence that that's what motivated them. It's just the temporal proximity of the fact that he happened to work.

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              MR. JOFFE: The temporal proximity of that and the
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      whole flow of communication because -- yes, your Honor. Yes.
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                          But there's nothing about the
               THE COURT:
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      communication --
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              MR. JOFFE: If I complain to my boss about something,
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      serious violation and I get terminated next day, I would
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      assume, in the absence of other reasons, that --
              THE COURT: But he didn't get terminated the next day.
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              MR. JOFFE: It was very close. It was almost the same
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      week when he made his last complaint. Yes, it was. And the
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      temporal proximity is an important factor. It's hardly
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      expected to --
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               THE COURT: So what else did he complain about other
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      than the -- about the ability for these people to work in the
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     United States?
              MR. JOFFE: The ability of people to work, that they
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      have to get paid in a normal, you know, they have to have a
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     payroll.
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               THE COURT: Where does it say that?
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                          Well they were trying to get --
              MR. JOFFE:
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               THE COURT:
                          Where do you allege that?
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              MR. JOFFE: Paragraph 70. For example, February 1 he
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      received an e-mail saying that why don't you pay the employees
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Right.

in cash from your own account.

THE COURT:

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So what was he complaining about? What violations was he complaining about?

MR. JOFFE: He says that you need to do it properly. You need to verify that your employees are proper employees. You need to provide -- I have an e-mail from him saying we don't want to go to jail if we do it like this.

> THE COURT: Is that in the complaint?

MR. JOFFE: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: About going to jail?

MR. JOFFE: Yes.

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THE COURT: What paragraph?

MR. JOFFE: Yes, your Honor. He says he sent an e-mail saying I don't want us to go to jail and we don't want to go to jail and immediately -- I have example of that --

> THE COURT: There's a paragraph that says that?

93. Paragraph 93. MR. JOFFE: Yes. "Nik, you and I don't want to go to jail. Without proper back office we cannot start sales," and so forth.

And the week later he got terminated, your Honor.

And the excuse, your Honor, that his budget was too high and he proposed to do too much was a ridiculous excuse, provided they said we will fund the company with \$3 million and they want to grow the company to make hundreds of millions in three years.

> All right. THE COURT:

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the assets.

MR. JOFFE: Then we don't get any documents from them internal that would have showed -- substantiated more. So we'll just have to go to deposition and they will ask them because that's what we see. We're telling them you're doing things wrong. You need to spend money. You promised \$3 million. Then you promised three hundred thousand. And nothing came. Nothing. THE COURT: So other than -- and then I'll hear from the other side. Other than Mr. Nickolay's personal assets, what else do you want to seize? Other than Nickolay's personal assets? MR. JOFFE: Well, we don't really -- we don't have information about others. THE COURT: That's what I'm asking. I want to make sure I understand what you're asking. Nickolay's assets are the ones we know. MR. JOFFE: THE COURT: You don't want to seize his house, do you? MR. JOFFE: He has property --THE COURT: Does he live in that house? MR. JOFFE: We are not sure. It's his family house, but he might have gotten divorced or separation. We're not sure. THE COURT: What are you asking me? MR. JOFFE: To lien, to put a lien on the house, on

THE COURT: On his personal house and his stocks? 1 2 MR. JOFFE: And the stock that he owns, yes, your Honor, in the United States. 3 4 THE COURT: Any other assets of any other defendant 5 that you have identified that you want seized? 6 MR. JOFFE: We haven't been able to identify other 7 defendants. They're not in the United States. THE COURT: So your request at this point is to attach 8 his home and his stock? 9 10 MR. JOFFE: Stock. 11 THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from the other 12 side. 13 MR. LEONOV: Thank you, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 MR. LEONOV: What would you like to hear? THE COURT: Well I want to know why I shouldn't do 16 17 that. MR. LEONOV: I believe you shouldn't do that for the 18 reasons, as stated. I believe the likelihood of success here 19 20 is at best questionable. I don't have much to add other than 21 the BCL also doesn't apply to contractors. And definitely 22 there is a contract here. It's in the statute, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Well contractors and contract are not the 24 same. 25 MR. LEONOV: I don't mean a contractor like a

1 contractor who builds a home. 2 THE COURT: You mean an independent contractor? 3 MR. LEONOV: Yes. THE COURT: Except I'm not quite sure where you get 4 5 that -- he's hired as the CEO of the company, how does that make him an independent contractor? 6 7 MR. LEONOV: It's not that. It's because he has a contract. 8 That aside, the reason I think you shouldn't attach it 9 10 is because the office was there before. That office was not 11 for discovery. It was an office for multiple venues. 12 office was closed when Mr. Morozov was there. The company --13 nobody is moving anything anywhere. No one is selling their 14 house. It belongs to him and his wife. They are definitely 15 not going to move the house. There's a mortgage on the house. THE COURT: Are they residents of the United States? 16 17 MR. LEONOV: They are residents of the United States. 18 That's correct. They are residents of the State of California. 19 So they are not removing anything. They did not move -- that's 20 ridiculous. There were no employees of ICOBOX Hub. Mr. Morozov was the only one. And he tried to higher in-house 21 22 counsel.

I don't think the assets should be attached. That's a harsh remedy. They would be left without the ability to -- I believe it's too much of a hassle to my client and it would be

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damaging to my clients for that reason. If they would be selling the home, but they are not. There were no transfers of They didn't try to refinance it. Nothing. And they are absolutely defending the lawsuit. So I believe that this attachment would be improper for those reasons. THE COURT: Is anybody else of these defendants that's in the United States other than --MR. LEONOV: Sometimes Daria would come in here. believe Anar was never here. Nickolay is here. And that's the reason I believe not. THE COURT: So other than Nickolay who else is here? MR. LEONOV: I believe Daria Generalova is sometimes in the United States. THE COURT: But he's a resident of --MR. LEONOV: She's primarily a resident, I believe, of Russia. THE COURT: And Nickolay? MR. LEONOV: Nickolay is primarily a resident of California. THE COURT: OK. And the -- what is the nature of the service contract with MEM? MR. LEONOV: That is actually one of our questions. We are not sure, which we believe is duplicative, so we're not

sure what that is; whichever way that the parties wanted to

struck the deal, that is fine. So maybe they wanted to split

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1 the funds. So I don't know exactly. 2 THE COURT: But there is a separate -- the service contract is not with Mr. Morozov --3 4 MR. LEONOV: Correct. 5 THE COURT: -- personally? The employment contract is with him? 6 7 MR. LEONOV: Correct. 8 THE COURT: He can enforce the employment contract? 9 MR. LEONOV: Correct. 10 THE COURT: Only MEM is the signatory to the service 11 contract? 12 MR. LEONOV: Correct. 13 THE COURT: What services were they supposed to 14 provide? 15 MR. LEONOV: Well, as discussed, Mr. Morozov did try 16 to negotiate the leases. That is absolutely correct. He did 17 try to negotiate them. What MEM did separately, we are not 18 sure. 19 The duties that I described in our opposition were 20 taken from the contracts. They are extremely similar to what I 21 believe, there are differences, but what MEM did, I am not 22 sure. So I cannot -- I cannot represent to the Court what MEM 23 did. 24 Both Mr. Morozov did, he did try to hire individuals; 25 he did try to negotiate the leases. And, unfortunately, no

lease was signed. But he really did do that. Yes. What MEM did, I don't know.

THE COURT: Give me a good reason or some idea why this whole deal went south.

MR. LEONOV: The reason this deal went south, your Honor, is because the budget proposal — we're not necessarily blaming Mr. Morozov for that, but the budget proposal for the startup was close to two hundred thousand dollars a month. And our clients believed that that's a little bit too high for that startup.

THE COURT: And they weren't aware of this prior to signing all these agreements?

MR. LEONOV: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: They weren't aware of this prior to signing all these agreements?

MR. LEONOV: No. Because nobody was proposed to that. So two hundred thousand dollars a month, your Honor, is slightly high. That was discussed with Mr. Morozov.

I can discuss the entire termination issue but, as you mentioned, that goes to the likelihood of success. Nowhere in the conversations, which are attached with slight translations as Exhibit C to my position, nowhere does it mention anything that he was terminated. As a matter of fact, within the same conversation, as soon as something was mentioned regarding the displeasure with that proposal, immediately Mr. Morozov stated:

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Get an attorney. Let us discuss something. My client was in shock. So why this deal went south is because people who were supposed to fund it, who were working with Nickolay, did not want to fund two hundred thousand dollars.

THE COURT: But I can't resolve the issue of whether he quit or whether he's fired at this point. I mean it sounds to me that he has at least a colorable claim that you guys weren't going to pay him any further beyond the 9th. And there is no indication in writing or otherwise that he said he was no longer working for the company.

MR. LEONOV: Exactly. And I would not be able to make that argument. So I'm not sure what happened with that termination at this point. Exactly.

THE COURT: Because you don't -- neither one of you argue that he was employed by the company beyond February 9.

MR. LEONOV: There is no way that could be argued.

THE COURT: How that happened.

MR. LEONOV: How that happened is something that I don't think we can address today, or least I cannot. I'm not prepared to do so.

As far as payment goes, your Honor, if you'd like me to discuss that, I will. But I believe there was sufficient discussion. But if you want, I can explain.

THE COURT: Which part? I'm sorry.

MR. LEONOV: I can respond regarding the \$27,000 if

you would like. I believe everything was discussed here. I 1 2 listened carefully. THE COURT: I mean I'm just not sure what he was paid 3 4 for. 5 MR. LEONOV: Your Honor he was paid -- MEM was paid according to the contracts. I'm not sure what MEM was paid for 6 7 exactly. But the \$27,000 translates into exactly a month of work for him. 8 9 THE COURT: That's what I thought. 10 MR. LEONOV: And for MEM. 11 THE COURT: And I read that. 12 MR. LEONOV: And my calculations are in my papers. 13 Conveniently translates to exactly that amount plus, minus a 14 few dollars. 15 And as far as the expenses go, I can address that too 16 but I believe it's not necessary unless the Court directs me to 17 do so. 18 THE COURT: How do you respond to his claim that he 19 wasn't paying timely? 20 MR. LEONOV: Very easily. Because he was paid \$27,000 21 in advance of his employment. 22 THE COURT: When he was he paid the 27,000? 23 MR. LEONOV: He was paid 27,000 -- I'm not sure of the

opposition. And he had claimed that Mr. Morozov was making,

date, but there's an e-mail, which is Exhibit E to my

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when he is actually trying to sue, he says less cash advance
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                I'm not sure of the exact date. And, yes, it was
      received.
      cash. I'm not sure why counsel is making a big deal out of it.
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      But, yes, it was cash. Cash advance received. Cash advance
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      prior. I do not have the exact date. So it's impossible to be
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      untimely if it was given as a cash advance.
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               THE COURT: And the cash advance was what amount?
              MR. LEONOV: $27,000.
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              THE COURT: That was the amount for --
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              MR. LEONOV: Correct.
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              THE COURT: -- that prorated the salary?
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              MR. LEONOV: Correct. And it translates perfectly
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      into --
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               THE COURT: So what was he paid for after -- and that
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      was --
              MR. LEONOV: He was not paid anything afterwards.
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               THE COURT: Well he says that he got some other
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      payments in February.
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              MR. LEONOV: I'm not -- I'm unaware of that.
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              MR. JOFFE: Your Honor, that's the payment we are
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      discussing. That's the only payment he got paid in February.
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               THE COURT:
                          The February 3rd.
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              MR. JOFFE:
                          February 3rd.
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              MR. LEONOV: Your Honor, that's -- I'm not sure how
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it's February 3rd when Mr. Morozov states in his e-mail, dated

22nd that this payment was in advance.

But let's assume that it was. He still received the \$27,000. I think it was an advance, according to Mr. Morozov's e-mail. I'm not sure advance of what. But that was that. So that's my explanation.

THE COURT: How do you respond to his claim of retaliatory termination? I'm not even sure the two of you agree that there was a termination.

MR. LEONOV: I'm not sure if there was a termination but let us, for the sake of argument, retaliation. The response is as follows. There could be no violation because the company had no employees. Clearly, there were complaints. And that the e-mail you're referring to regarding the jail, that's Exhibit E. That is the only close proximity to any complaints.

Yes. There were complaints. Something is improper. Yes. I understand that.

But that is not the reason which — that there is no reason in any communications between the parties and which was produced regarding that. The only communications are about money, hiring people, regarding the proper documents for the leases of the offices, about proper corporate structures. Those — that is pretty much it. Whatever plaintiff is alleging, frankly, is just throwing everything and the kitchen sink at my clients.

THE COURT: What was the communication that reflected the breakdown in the employment relationship?

MR. LEONOV: That would be, your Honor, the terminal communication would be Exhibit B to my opposition.

THE COURT: B would be what?

that's why it's not going to work.

MR. LEONOV: B is the terminal communication between Mr. Evdokimov -- lots of it is in Russian. It is. But if you take a look at it, it mentions the numbers. It mentions the numbers in English.

THE COURT: So what does this communication --

MR. LEONOV: It is basically the people -Mr. Evdokimov, which is a defendant, speaking to other
individuals regarding this budget and then explaining that

Exhibit C is the communications which we tried our best to translate, and I can represent that most of it is translated fine. Exhibit C is the communications on February 9, on February 9, regarding this particular issue and it ends with -- and it ends with, "I'm grateful to listen," and it ends with, "get an attorney" and that's about it. So on the same date. And that is a communication that led down to the breakup of this relationship, call it a termination or call it whatever -- be it as it may at this point, your Honor. And that's it.

THE COURT: And this was a communication between?

1 MR. LEONOV: Nickolay and plaintiff. 2 THE COURT: And the essence of the -- how was this 3 left? You say the end says what. 4 MR. LEONOV: At the end -- let me try to find it. 5 At the end, the page next to last, your Honor, the box second from the bottom. Nik, I tried to resolve the conflict. 6 7 I suggest you talk on the zoom on Monday 9, 3 p.m. Today we're flying to New York. We'll talk with my lawyer Dimitry Joffe. 8 9 I introduced you. It is desirable you also have a lawyer. 10 This is pretty much how it ends. And this entire 11 conversation is regarding the funding and the plan. 12 I'm sorry. Where are you? THE COURT: 13 MR. LEONOV: You can't see it? Page second to last. 14 THE COURT: Second to last. And the box starts? 15 MR. LEONOV: Second box from the bottom. 16 THE COURT: From Nik to Eugene? 17 MR. LEONOV: Yes. 18 "Hey, I will certainly participate"? THE COURT: 19 MR. LEONOV: No, your Honor. I probably misquided 20 you. 21 Third from last. Excuse me. 22 THE COURT: The one before that or after that?

MR. LEONOV: The one before that. Third from last.

Second box -- second box from the bottom.

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THE COURT: "Nik, to try to resolve the conflict."

1 MR. LEONOV: Correct. 2 THE COURT: Which conflict is being referred to? 3 MR. LEONOV: That would be too long for me to put on 4 the record but unless your Honor directs me. 5 THE COURT: Just in general. 6 MR. LEONOV: This is regarding the funding. 7 THE COURT: The funding? 8 MR. LEONOV: Yes. 9 THE COURT: So at what point did the parties part 10 ways? 11 MR. LEONOV: After that point, after that 12 communication, we believe that a notice of lawsuit was sent to 13 internal counsel in California. I'm not sure of that date. So 14 immediately thereafter, shortly thereafter. 15 THE COURT: And this was on February 9. MR. LEONOV: This was on February 9. I'm not aware of 16 17 when the notice was sent to counsel in California. And then he 18 contacted the clients. And then we stepped in. THE COURT: So there is no -- this communication --19 20 there is no communication that indicates one that basically 21 says you're fired? 22 MR. LEONOV: No. 23 THE COURT: Or basically says I quit?

MR. LEONOV: Exactly.

THE COURT: You say this is --

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1 MR. LEONOV: This is it. THE COURT: -- the final communication between the two 2 parties over the financing issues? 3 4 MR. LEONOV: Correct. 5 THE COURT: And the next thing that you heard --MR. LEONOV: Well not the next day but shortly 6 7 thereafter. 8 THE COURT: The next communication was the filing of the lawsuit. 9 10 MR. LEONOV: I believe it was a demand letter that was 11 sent to general counsel in California. 12 THE COURT: OK. 13 MR. LEONOV: And then they couldn't reach a 14 settlement. 15 THE COURT: And then what did the demand letter --MR. LEONOV: I do not have it with me. I believe it 16 was written by plaintiff's counsel to general counsel. 17 THE COURT: But did that demand letter reference a 18 demand for what? 19 20 MR. LEONOV: For money. 21 THE COURT: For money for him personally or funding 22 for the company? MR. LEONOV: No, no. That letter really came from 23 24 Mr. Morozov, from Mr. Morozov, to plaintiff's attorney, stating

that I'm owed money on the contracts and pay so much money; not

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1 the money to the company. 2 THE COURT: The money he said he was owed. 3 MR. LEONOV: Yes. 4 THE COURT: The demand for those monies. 5 MR. LEONOV: For this lawsuit. 6 THE COURT: And did it say one way or the other 7 whether he was fired or quit? MR. LEONOV: I believe it was because he was 8 terminated. I believe so, but I do not have the letter. 9 10 THE COURT: That's fine. I accept that. All right. 11 All right. That's fine. That's sufficient for my 12 purposes. Thank you. 13 Mr. Joffe, did you want to add anything further at 14 this point. 15 MR. JOFFE: Just on the termination point. I just wanted to -- I'm not sure what Mr. Leonov quoted that box of 16 17 the February 9 text from Mr. Evdokimov where at the end,

MR. JOFFE: Just on the termination point. I just wanted to -- I'm not sure what Mr. Leonov quoted that box of the February 9 text from Mr. Evdokimov where at the end, February 9, he says to my client: Let's agree on something comfortable for both of us. I would gladly offer you the position of an adviser or a consultant with a subsequent return at the moment when we are making, sustain a profit. That was on February 9. Evdokimov says that we can maybe bring you as an adviser or consultant, which is not paid position, instead of the CEO. That was the termination.

MR. LEONOV: With all due respect, that is there, but

it doesn't say instead.

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MR. JOFFE: That's an issue of whether he was terminated or not. This is something I'm not prepared to discuss at this point.

THE COURT: This is not a motion to dismiss. So I'm not trying to judge the merits of this only to the extent of the likelihood of the success on the merits.

Quite frankly with regard to this case I'm not convinced that for an attachment that the plaintiff has demonstrated both the likelihood of success on the merits or that it is appropriate under the statute, either statute, to seize any property of Nickolay at this stage of the proceedings. There is no indication that if he is found to be personally liable, and I think there is some question as to whether or not he is personally liable, but there is no indication that any steps have been taken to make any assets unavailable for a judgment or to dissipate or to hide any assets. There is no indication that he believed that he would personally be somehow judgment proof if there was a judgment against him. I don't find a compelling reason to seize either his -- or to attach either his home or any of his personal assets at this stage of the proceedings given the numerous issues and legal issues and legal hurdles that I think the plaintiff needs to overcome to not only prevail on one or more of his claims but to prevail against Mr. -- against Nickolay

personally given that it doesn't even appear that there's any allegation against him that he somehow put his personal assets or his personal liability at stake with regard to either the MEM contract or the employment contract. Those contracts were with the company. The plaintiff would have to either pierce the corporate veil somehow or demonstrate that he has exposed himself to this personal liability under the contract or under the -- the service contract or other employment contract.

Also, I think the allegations with -- I think that the plaintiff has a significant hurdle to demonstrate that he is covered by the statute in order to enforce his rights as a CEO of a company. I think the definition of employee that the plaintiff is relying upon I think that that definition for the most part excludes the kind of employment agreement that he had. And whether he can demonstrate that the company and/or Mr. -- or Nickolay or any of these other defendants are liable for a breach of contract or are liable for some retaliatory act, quite frankly, the only retaliatory act is really an accusation against Nickolay. It's not really an accusation against any other defendant. It's an accusation that Nickolay was the one who made that decision and did so in retaliation and did so on behalf of ICOBOX Hub, the signatory to the contract.

So, I'm not going to further assess other than the likelihood of success, of which I don't think has been

demonstrated at this point, I'm not going to further assess the merits of the claims here.

I think the parties should go ahead and proceed. But I think that this is not an appropriate case, and the plaintiff has not made out a claim for attaching the personal property of the principal and/or/shareholder of ICOBOX Hub, the company with which he had an employment contract, or MEM, the company that is the plaintiff based on the service contract.

So I'm going to deny the motion for an order of attachment.

If it turns out that during discovery it appears that assets are being transferred or being moved in such a way that it raises issues as to whether or not the defendant is either trying to dissipate or put assets out of the reach of the recovery if there's a judgment against them, then I will reconsider whether or not there is such evidence to support an attachment of some property. But on this record I think it's insufficient to order an attachment at the beginning of this litigation given the particular hurdles that the plaintiff must overcome in order to get a personal judgment against Nickolay and a judgment for which he will be responsible to satisfy out of his own personal assets. So I am going to deny the motion for an attachment.

I probably should agree upon a case management plan to complete discovery and I will -- if there are any other issues

that arise with regard to discovery, bring them to my attention. I think I will schedule a conference -- do we have

THE DEPUTY CLERK: No.

another conference?

THE COURT: I think I will schedule a conference for $\mbox{--}$ I think we do have a proposed date in February.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: The 13th.

THE COURT: February 13 at 9:45. Let's see where we are at that point in time and, as I said, if any other issues arise or any further information with regard to the individual defendants and their assets or transfer or suspicious transfer of assets, then bring it to my attention and I'll revisit this. But I'm going to deny it without prejudice to renew it if there's some specific evidence that would warrant protecting a potential likely judgment by plaintiff.

So we'll set it down for February 13 at 9:45 and we'll see we're where we are at that point in time.

And if you want the assistance of the magistrate judge or mediation for possible settlement discussion in the meantime just let me know and I'll refer you there in the first instance. But, otherwise, move forward with discovery. If there are any other disputes with regard to discovery, bring them to my attention by letter and a quick response as you did recently and then I'll resolve those right away so you can move forward efficiently.

1 MR. JOFFE: Thank you, your Honor. 2 MR. LEONOV: Thank you, your Honor. 3 One more thing, since we're here. I apologize and 4 thank you for your time. 5 I believe we have a January date to complete discovery at this point. We'll do our best. 6 7 THE COURT: How much time do you think reasonably? MR. LEONOV: I think we need slightly longer, just 8 9 because we will produce Victoria. We need a couple depositions 10 and people in different countries. I just, frankly, don't think we will have the time. Plaintiff's counsel depose 11 Victoria and me depose plaintiff by that time. 12 13 THE COURT: Do you think you can do it before the end 14 of February? 15 MR. LEONOV: Definitely. THE COURT: So I'll anticipate that hopefully you can 16 17 finish discovery by the time I see you next, by February 13; if not, then you can tell me, hopefully you'll tell me you're just 18 about finished up and what it is. 19 20 MR. LEONOV: Thank you so much, Judge. 21 MR. JOFFE: Thank you, your Honor. 22 (Adjourned) 23 24 25